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JURISDICTION 
This Petition is based on a final order of the Utah 
State Tax Commission ("Commission") following a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1992). The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter by virtue of the 
Supreme Court's authority to transfer this matter to the Utah 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
(1992) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Issue: Did the Commission err when it interpreted Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) to mean that certain 
establishments engaged in "manufacturing" may 
nevertheless be excluded from the definition of 
"manufacturing facilities" in applying Utah's sales tax 
exemption on purchases of manufacturing equipment? 
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of 
law for which the Commission's decision is reviewed 
under a correction-of-error standard, giving no 
deference to the Commission's decision. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing 
Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). 
II. Issue; Did the Commission erroneously apply its own 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) to the 
facts of this case? 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of 
law for which the Commission's decision is reviewed 
under a correction-of-error standard, giving no 
deference to the Commission's decision. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989); Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing 
Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). 
III. Issue: Did the Commission abuse its discretion, if any 
existed, to interpret Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) 
when it interpreted that statute to mean that certain 
equipment purchased and used in "manufacturing" 
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activities are ineligible for a sales tax exemption 
whose purpose was to encourage investment in 
manufacturing equipment? 
Standard of Review: The Commission's exercise of 
discretion in interpreting specific statutory terms is 
reviewed for reasonableness. The Commission abuses this 
discretion when its action—viewed in the context of the 
language and purpose of the statute—is unreasonable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1989); Morton 




The sales tax exemption at issue on this Petition 
provides in relevant part: 
59-12-104. Exemptions 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the 
taxes imposed by this chapter: 
. . . 
(15) Sales or leases of machinery and 
equipment purchased or leased by a manufacturer for 
use in new or expanding operations (excluding 
normal operating replacements, which includes 
replacement machinery and equipment even though 
they may increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any manufacturing 
facility in Utah. Manufacturing facility means an 
establishment described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 
of the Standard Industrial Classification Manual 
1972, of the federal Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Management and Budget. For 
purposes of this subsection, the commission shall 
by rule define "new or expanding operations11 and 
"establishment." By October 1, 1991, and every 
five years thereafter, the commission shall review 
this exemption and make recommendations to the 
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee concerning 
whether the exemption should be continued, 
modified, or repealed. In its report to the 
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee, the tax 
commission review shall include at least: 
(a) the cost of the exemption; 
(b) the purpose and effectiveness of the 
exemption; and 
(c) the benefits of the exemption to the state. 
Utah Code Ann, § 59-12-104(15) (1987 & Supp. 1991). 
The Commission is reviewable pursuant to the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act as follows: 
63-46b-16. Judicial Review—Formal adjudicative 
proceedings 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court 
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines 
that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule 
on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional 
on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion 
delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989). 
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Qth*r 
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management, 
and Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual 
1972, Division D, at 57-218, Division I, at 295-334 
(1972) (reproduced at Item 2 of Addendum attached). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case 
This Petition is brought by Bonneville 
International Corporation ("Bonneville") from a final decision 
of the Commission following a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
The proceedings spawning this Petition began on 
November 13, 1990. Bonneville at that time requested an 
advisory opinion from the Commission concerning the 
application of a sales tax exemption to purchases of 
manufacturing equipment by two Bonneville divisions, 
Bonneville Communications and Video West. [Record at 96-97] 
On December 3, 1990, the Commission issued an opinion 
indicating that none of the subject equipment purchases were 
eligible for the sales tax exemption set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated 59-12-104(15) (1987 & Supp. 1991). [Record at 94-
95]. Bonneville filed a Petition for Redetermination before 
the Commission on January 24, 1991. A formal hearing was held 
before an Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 1992. After 
that hearing, the Commission and Bonneville agreed that 
Bonneville's Petition for Redetermination may be treated as a 
claim for refund of sales taxes paid. [Record at 12-13]. 
On September 2, 1992, the Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. The 
Commission there reaffirmed its previous declaratory order 
denying Bonneville the sales tax exemption on its equipment 
purchases. Bonneville now brings this Petition for Review of 
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Final Agency Action seeking review of the Commission's Final 
Decision. 
II* Relevant Facts 
Bonneville is a Utah corporation engaged in radio 
and television broadcasting. The two Bonneville divisions at 
the core of this controversy, Bonneville Communications and 
Video West, are engaged in the manufacturing and reproduction 
of audio tapes and video tapes respectively. The two 
divisions perform their assembly, duplication, and 
distribution activities at two distinct locations that are 
separate and apart from each other and from Bonneville and its 
other divisions. Bonneville Communications and Video West are 
separate cost centers within Bonneville with their own 
separate financial statements. 
The manufacturing processes of Bonneville 
Communications and Video West are substantially the same. The 
primary distinction between the two divisions is that 
Bonneville Communications manufactures reproduced audio tapes, 
while Video West manufactures reproduced video tapes. 
In an effort to expand their existing operations, 
both Bonneville Communications and Video West have purchased 
and now use numerous pieces of machinery and equipment in 
their manufacturing processes. Bonneville paid Utah sales 
taxes on the purchases of that equipment. 
Bonneville has requested that the Commission rule 
that Bonneville is entitled to a refund of the sales taxes 
paid on purchases of equipment used by Bonneville 
Communications and Video West, Curiously, the Commission has 
allowed the exemption for Bonneville Communications but not 
for Video West. In so doing, the Commission properly 
stipulated that Bonneville Communications' activities of 
manufacturing reproduced audio tapes qualify it as a 
"manufacturing facility" and that its purchases of equipment 
fall within the exemption provided for in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 59-12-104(15). [Record at 14-17]. The Commission 
also stipulated that Video West is a "manufacturer engaged in 
the reproduction of video tapes." [Record at 67]. 
Despite the Commission's own admissions about the 
similarities between Bonneville Communications and Video West, 
the Commission has denied a sales tax exemption for purchases 
of Video West equipment. Although the Commission acknowledges 
that Video West's activities are "manufacturing," the 
Commission somehow theorizes that Video West is not a 
"manufacturing facility" as that term is used in Section 59-
12-104(15) . The Commission apparently believes that while the 
sales tax exemption statute allows the exemption for 
manufacturers of audio tapes, it simultaneously disallows the 
exemption for manufacturers of video tapes. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this case, the Commission misinterpreted the 
sales tax exemption provided for in Section 59-12-104(15) by 
denying the exemption to Video West even though the Commission 
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agrees that Video West is a "manufacturer." Although the 
exemption provides that the term "manufacturing facility" is 
to include establishments whose activities are included in SIC 
Codes 2000 through 3999, the Commission has missed the import 
of the Legislature's intent by using that reference. SIC 
Codes 2000 through 3999 are the range of codes included in 
Subdivision "D" of the SIC Manual 1972 entitled 
"Manufacturing." Accordingly, the Commission should recognize 
that the Legislature's reference to Codes 2000 through 3999 
was intended as a shorthand way of saying that any 
establishment involved in a "manufacturing" activity qualifies 
for the exemption. But the Commission does not so read the 
exemption statute. Instead, the Commission believes that a 
"manufacturing" activity may nevertheless be excluded from the 
exemption if the activity seems to fall within a SIC Code 
description outside those included in 2000 through 3999. The 
Commission consequently concludes—based on a tortured reading 
of the SIC Manual—that video tape reproduction falls within 
one of the SIC Manual's "service" descriptions. This 
conclusion can only charitably be characterized as incongruous 
in view of the fact that the Commission previously stipulated 
that Video West is engaged in "manufacturing." The Commission 
has plainly erred in interpreting the statute in such a way 
that a "manufacturer" can fail to qualify for the exemption. 
Even if the Commission's interpretation of the 
statute is correct, however, its application of that 
interpretation to the facts of this case is wrong. Using the 
Commission's own methodology of looking first at the Code 
description without regard to whether the activity is 
"manufacturing11 or "service" leads to a different result than 
the Commission reached. The Commission did not accept 
Bonneville's argument that video tape reproduction falls 
within Code 3652 which includes the description "manufacturing 
phonograph records and pre-recorded magnetic tape." Rather, 
the Commission concluded that video tape reproduction falls 
within Code 7819. That code description falls within the 
"Services" subdivision of the Manual, and includes "services" 
allied to the motion picture industry. The Commission's 
conclusion that video tape reproduction is more likely to fit 
within Code 7819 than Code 3652 is not supported by the 
language of the descriptions. Code 7819 is a service code 
clearly designed to include Hollywood-style movie making and 
services allied thereto. In contrast, Code 3652 contains the 
phrase "pre-recorded magnetic tape." This is precisely the 
product that Video West manufactures for wholesale 
distribution. 
Finally, the Commission has not been granted any 
discretion to define the term "manufacturing facility" as it 
is used in Section 59-12-104(15). Even if the Commission has 
been granted such discretion, the Commission's decision in 
this case is an abuse of that discretion. Any agency abuses 
its discretion when its interpretation of a statutory 
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provision is unreasonable in light of the clear purpose of the 
statute. The exemption, of course, is clearly intended to 
encourage investment in new manufacturing facilities in Utah. 
The Commission should accordingly interpret the statute in 
such a way as to effectuate that plain purpose. The 
Commission, however, has done precisely the opposite. It has 
interpreted the statute such that Video West's new investment 
in manufacturing equipment does not qualify for the exemption. 
Contrary to the Legislature's purpose, therefore, the 
Commission has discouraged investment in Utah facilities to 
manufacture reproduced video tapes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Commission Erroneously Interpreted The Sales Tax 
Exemption Statute By Concluding That Video Tape 
Reproduction Necessarily Falls Within The ,fServicesM 
Division Of The SIC Manual Instead Of The 
"Manufacturing" Division. 
A. The Commission's Interpretation of Section 59-
12-104(15) Presents a Question of Law Subject 
to De Novo Review by This Court. 
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. 
The Commission's decision was based purely on its 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1992) and 
its application of that provision to the facts. Accordingly, 
this petition presents the question of whether the Commission 
properly interpreted and applied the statute to the 
uncontroverted facts previously described. Under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (the "UAPA"), this Court may 
grant the relief sought by Bonneville if "it determines that 
[Bonneville] has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: . . . (d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989). 
The quoted portion of Section 63-46b-16 has been 
construed to mean that an agency's interpretation of statutory 
provisions is to be reviewed under a "correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the agency['s] decision[]." 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 
1991); Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 
664, 668-71 (Utah 1991). Thus, f,/a court may decide that the 
agency has erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely 
disagrees with the agency's interpretation./>f Morton, 814 
P.2d at 587 (emphasis added); Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 670 
(quoting Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 5-116 
comment, 15 U.L.A. 128 (1981)). 
The Commission's application of the law to the 
facts presents a question of law likewise subject to the de 
novo standard of review. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Morton, "in granting judicial relief when an 'agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the law,' the language of 
section 63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a grant of 
discretion,1 a correction-of-error standard is used in 
1
 Nothing in the language of Section 59-12-104(15) indicates 
an explicit or implicit grant of discretion to the Commission in 
interpreting the scope of the exemption as it relates to the 
present case. Of course, the statute expressly grants the 
Commission discretion in defining the terms "new or expanding 
operations" and "establishment." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) 
(1987 & Supp. 1991). In this case, the Commission does not dispute 
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reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a 
statutory term." Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 (emphasis added). 
B. The Commission Misinterprets the Meaning of 
Section 59-12-104(15) and its Decision Must be 
Reversed. 
The Commission's divergent treatment of Bonneville 
Communications and Video West underscores the Commission's 
misunderstanding of Section 59-12-104(15). No rational system 
of taxation would classify the manufacture of audio tapes as 
a "manufacturing" activity and allow an exemption, and 
simultaneously classify the manufacture of video tapes as a 
"service" and disallow the same exemption. This approach, 
however, is precisely what the Commission has engaged in here. 
The Legislature could not have intended such an inconsistent 
and irrational application of the sales tax exemption. 
To unmask the Commission's misinterpretation of the 
statute in question, one must begin by fairly reading the 
language of the statute itself. Section 59-12-104 sets forth 
that Video West is an "establishment," and there is likewise no 
dispute over whether Video West's equipment purchases were for use 
in "new or expanding operations." This case presents issues 
relating only to the Commission's interpretation of the meaning of 
the terms "manufacturing facility" and "manufacturer." 
Consequently, the standard of review in this case is the 
correction-of-error standard both as to the Commission's 
interpretation of the statute and as to its application of the 
statute to the facts presented. 
Should this Court disagree with Bonneville and decide that 
the Commission has been granted some discretion in the 
interpretation of the terms "manufacturing facility" and 
"manufacturer," Bonneville nevertheless believes the Commission s 
decision in this case would constitute an abuse of that discretion. 
See infra Section III. 
i o 
a number of sales that are exempt from Utah's Sales and Use 
Tax Act, Subsection (15) provides an exemption for "sales or 
leases of equipment purchased or leased by a manufacturer for 
use in new or expanding operations . . . in any manufacturing 
facility in Utah." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1992) 
(emphasis added). In this case, the Commission does not 
dispute that Video West's activities and operations qualify it 
as a "manufacturer engaged in the reproduction of video 
tapes." [Record at 67]. 
The Commission's decision to deny Video West the 
exemption relates to its interpretation of the sentence 
following the language quoted above. That sentence of former 
Section 59-12-104(15)2 defines "manufacturing facility" as 
follows: "Manufacturing facility means an establishment 
described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the Standard Industrial 
Classification Manual 1972, of the federal Executive Office of 
the President, Office of Management and Budget." Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1987 & Supp. 1991). Relying on this 
language, the Commission construes Section 59-12-104(15) to 
mean that equipment purchased for the manufacture of 
reproduced video tapes can only be exempt if the manufacture 
2
 Former Section 59-12-104(15) was amended in 1992 to convert 
the statute's reference to the Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual ("SIC Manual") from the 1972 version to the 1987 version. 
See 1992 Utah Laws ch. 298, § 2. In this case, the sales at issue 
took place well before the 1992 amendment. For purposes of this 
Petition, therefore, the definition of "manufacturing facility" is 
as set forth in former section 59-12-104(15) by reference to the 
1972 SIC Manual. 
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of such reproduced tapes falls within one of the SIC Codes 
from 2000 to 3999. 
The Commission's interpretation leads it to engage 
in a ill-fated, two-step inquiry. First, the Commission asks 
which SIC Code the taxpayer's activity most easily fits into 
without regard to whether the activity is a "manufacturing" 
activity or a "service" activity. Second, the Commission asks 
whether the SIC Code it has identified as the most likely one 
falls within Codes 2000 to 3999. If not, the taxpayer is 
denied the exemption. This analysis leads the Commission to 
apply the exemption in an irrational way. 
Adhering to its own methodology, the Commission 
simply set out to determine which SIC Code it believed most 
closely described Video West's activities. The Commission 
rejected Bonneville's argument that Video West's manufacture 
of reproduced video tapes logically falls within SIC Code 3652 
which is entitled "Phonograph Records and Pre-recorded 
Magnetic Tape." This code includes establishments engaged in 
"manufacturing phonograph records and pre-recorded magnetic 
tape." Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget, Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual 1972 190 (1972) ("SIC Manual 1972"). Instead, the 
Commission concluded that the manufacture of reproduced video 
tapes falls within the SIC Code 7819 which includes activities 
described as follows: 
7819 Services Allied to Motion Picture Production 
Establishments primarily engaged in 
performing services independent of motion 
picture production but allied thereto, such 
as motion picture film processing, editing 
and titling? casting bureaus; wardrobe and 
studio property rental; television tape 
services (editing, transfers, etc.); and 
stock footage film libraries. 
SIC Manual 1972 at 315 (emphasis added). 
Under the Commission's interpretation of Section 
59-12-104(15), a taxpayer can be engaged in an activity that 
the Commission agrees is clearly "manufacturing," but may 
nevertheless be excluded from the statutory definition of 
"manufacturing facility." If the Commission determines that 
the manufacturer's activity is somehow mentioned or described 
by a one of the non-manufacturing SIC Codes, then the 
legislative exemption for equipment purchased for 
"manufacturing facilities" does not apply. 
Bonneville submits that a rational interpretation 
of Section 59-12-104(15) in light of its purpose is demanded. 
The purpose for creating this exemption for purchases of new 
equipment used for manufacturing in Utah is diamond clear. 
The Legislature obviously sought to create incentives (or at 
least remove any disincentives caused by the sales tax) toward 
investment by "manufacturers" in "manufacturing facilities" in 
Utah. Only with this purpose in mind can Section 59-12-
104(15) be interpreted properly. 
Viewed in this way, the Legislature's definition of 
"manufacturing facility" as any establishment described by SIC 
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Codes 2000 through 3999 takes on a meaning much different from 
the one on which the Commission has settled- Instead of 
limiting the exemption to some manufacturers to be chosen 
according to the arbitrary application of the SIC Codes by the 
Commission, the Legislature intended that the exemption would 
apply to all manufacturers who purchase new equipment for use 
in Utah. 
This intent is evident when one considers the way 
in which the Legislature defined "manufacturing facility." 
The Legislature's definition of "manufacturing facility" as 
any establishment described by SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 is 
simply a shorthand way of expressing its intent to include all 
establishments engaged in activities that are properly 
described as "manufacturing." Indeed, the SIC Manual 1972 is 
divided into many "Divisions" one of which is entitled 
"Division D, Manufacturing." Not coincidentally. Division D 
of the Manual consists of Codes 2000 to 3999—the precise 
range of codes used by the Legislature in its definition of 
"manufacturing facility." In fact, "Division D" of the Manual 
is prefaced by a comment in which the drafters of the Manual 
define the scope of Division D as follows: 
The manufacturing division includes 
establishments engaged in the mechanical or 
chemical transformation of materials or substances 
into new products. These establishments are 
usually described as plants, factories, or mills 
and characteristically use power driven machines 
and materials handling equipment. Establishments 
engaged in assembling component parts of 
manufactured products are also considered 
manufacturing if the new product is neither a 
structure nor other fixed improvement• 
SIC Manual 1972 at 57. 
The Legislature's obvious intent when it defined 
"manufacturing facility" by reference to Codes 2000 to 3999 
was to insure that all establishments engaged in activities 
properly described as "manufacturing" would be eligible for 
the exemption. As discussed above, the Commission does not 
dispute that Video West's video tape reproduction business is 
"manufacturing." Yet, the Commission's interpretation of the 
statute led it to conclude that Video West's activities are 
best described by a SIC Code found in "Division I" of the 
Manual entitled "Services" thereby rendering Video West 
ineligible for the exemption. The Commission's slavish 
attention to descriptions contained in the twenty-year old 
Manual has frustrated the Legislature's policy of encouraging 
investment in facilities that are clearly engaged in 
manufacturing. One must recognize that in 1972 the videotape 
duplication industry did not exist. Of course, neither did a 
whole host of other new industries that clearly involve 
manufacturing. Instead of recognizing these facts in applying 
the exemption, the Commission chooses to hide behind the 
inherent limitations of the 1972 SIC Code descriptions and 
uses those descriptions to limit the scope of the exemption in 
an irrational way. 
A reasoned interpretation of Section 59-12-104(15) 
would have the Commission determine first whether the 
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taxpayer's activities are properly described as 
"manufacturing." Because the Legislature has defined the term 
"manufacturing facility" by reference to Division D of the SIC 
Manual 1972, the Commission should look to the beginning of 
the Manual's Division D in making this determination. When 
the taxpayer is clearly engaged in an activity that is 
properly described as "manufacturing" within the definition 
used at the beginning of Division D, the Commission should 
conclude that the taxpayer's establishment is a "manufacturing 
facility" within the meaning of Section 59-12-104(15). Once 
that determination is made, the question of which SIC Code 
within Division D applies is less important. What is 
important, is that the Commission should not seek to force a 
square peg into a round hole by categorizing an admitted 
manufacturing process into a service code simply to limit the 
application of the exemption. If, as in this case, there is 
no manufacturing Code that expressly includes the activity in 
question, the Commission should simply apply the manufacturing 
Code that most closely describes that activity. 
The Commission's denial of the exemption in the 
case of Video West is contrary to the Legislature's intent and 
purpose to encourage investment in manufacturing facilities. 
The Commission's decision in this case amounts to nothing more 
than an attempt to deny a taxpayer a valid exemption based on 
a wooden reading of an out-dated SIC Manual. Because the 
Commission's decision in this case was based on an erroneous 
1 O 
interpretation of Section 59-12-104(15), the denial of 
Bonneville's request for refund must be reversed. 
II. The Commission Also Erred In The Application Of Section 
59-12-104(15) To The Undisputed Facts Of This Case. 
A correct interpretation of Section 59-12-104(15) 
in light of its true purposes would lead the Commission to a 
different result when applied to the facts of this case. In 
any event, the Commission's application of the statute to the 
facts of this case was erroneous. 
A. Even if the Commission's Interpretation of the 
Statute Was Correct, it Erred in its 
Application of the Statute to These Facts. 
As the UAPA makes clear, the application of a 
statute is also a question of law subject to the correction-
of-error standard of review. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. 
Auditing Div. . 814 P. 2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). This Court need 
not defer to the Commission's application of the law to the 
undisputed facts in this case. 
In denying Bonneville's claim for refund of sales 
tax, the Commission determined that—although Video West was 
engaged in the "manufacture" of reproduced video tapes—it was 
not a "manufacturing facility" within the meaning of the 
statute. The Commission reached that conclusion because it 
determined that the manufacture of reproduced video tapes does 
not fall within any of the "manufacturing" SIC Codes 2000 to 
3999. In so doing, the Commission rejected Bonneville's 
argument that the reproduction of video tapes falls within SIC 
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Code 3652 entitled "Phonograph Records and Pre-recorded 
Magnetic Tape" whose description is as follows: 
"Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing phonograph 
records and pre-recorded magnetic tape." SIC Manual 1972 at 
190. Instead, the Commission concluded that Video West's 
manufacture of reproduced video tapes more likely falls into 
the SIC Code 7819, which contains the following description. 
7819. Services Allied to Motion Picture Production 
Establishments primarily engaged in performing 
services independent of motion picture production 
but allied thereto, such as motion picture film 
processing, editing and titling; casting bureaus; 
wardrobe and studio property rental; television 
tape services (editing, transfers, etc.); and stock 
footage film libraries. 
SIC Manual 1972 at 315. The sum total of the Commission's 
reasoning was as follows: "The foregoing list of activities is 
not exclusive and is broad enough to encompass video tape 
reproduction. The 1987 SIC Manual specifically places 'motion 
picture and video tape reproduction' in activity code 7819." 
[Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission dated September 
3, 1992 at 5.] 
The Commission's determination that Video West's 
activities fit into Code 7819 instead of 3652 wobbles 
precariously on several erroneous premises. First, the 
Commission apparently relies on the "intent" of the drafters 
of the 1972 SIC Manual by stating that "the Commission 
considers it unlikely that the drafters of the 1972 SIC Manual 
intended to include video tape reproduction in the same 
activity code as activities related to audio media such as 
phonograph records." [Final Decision of Utah State Tax 
Commission dated September 3, 1992 at 4.] This intent 
"reasoning" is wholly misplaced. The SIC Manual 1972 gives no 
indication that its drafters had any intent at all regarding 
the reproduction of video tapes. In 1972, the video tape 
reproduction industry did not exist, and the drafters of the 
Manual clearly did not include video reproduction in any Code 
description. Moreover, the Commission's obsession with the 
intent of the SIC Manual's drafters misses the point. The 
Legislature's reference to SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 does not 
mean the Legislature intended to exclude certain manufacturers 
from the exemption based on a hypertechnical reading of the 
Code descriptions. Thus, the Commission should ask not what 
the intent behind the SIC Code was, but rather, what 
activities did the Utah State Legislature intend to include in 
the exemption when it drafted Section 59-12-104(15). 
A second flawed premise on which the Commission 
relies is that the intent of those who drafted the 1987 SIC 
Manual is somehow relevant in determining what the intent of 
the 1972 Manual's drafters would have been. This is evident 
from the Commission's statement that its "interpretation of 
the scope of activity code 3652 is supported by the fact that 
the 1987 SIC Manual specifically limits activity code 3652 to 
audio media." [Id.] Although the drafters of the 1987 Manual 
have indeed limited Code 3652 to audio media, this fact does 
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not have any bearing on the proper interpretation of the 1972 
Manual's descriptions. The 1972 Manual was drafted by 
personnel at the Office of Management and Budget during the 
Nixon Administration. Those who drafted the 1987 Manual 
during the Reagan administration, are undoubtedly a different 
group whose actions tell nothing of the intent behind the 1972 
Manual. 
In support of its decision that Video West's 
activities fall within Code 7819, the Commission's third 
infirm premise is that "[t]he 1987 SIC Manual specifically 
places 'motion picture and video tape reproduction' in 
activity code 7819." [Id.] As discussed above, however, the 
language of the 1987 Manual is irrelevant on this point. 
Indeed, the fact that the drafters of the 1987 Manual 
recognized a need to include a description including video 
tape reproduction does not prove an intent on the part of the 
1972 drafters, but rather the utter lack of any such intent 
regarding video reproduction. Moreover, even though the 1987 
Manual includes in Code 7819 some mention of video tape 
reproduction, this does not mean the 1987 Manual's drafters 
intended that all facilities engaged in video reproduction are 
engaged in a "service." Clearly the reproduction of video 
tapes can be either a service or manufacturing, depending on 
the circumstances. In the present case, the Commission does 
not dispute that Video West's video tape reproduction 
activities are manufacturing. [Record at 67]. 
Fourth, the Commission's determination that the 
description in Code 7819 is more likely to include Video 
West's activities than the description in Code 3652 is simply 
not supported by the language of those descriptions. It is at 
least as likely that Video West's manufacture of reproduced 
video tapes fits within Code 3652. The language of Code 3652 
in no way excludes video tape reproduction. Both the title of 
Code 3652 and the language in the description use the phrase 
"phonograph records and pre-recorded magnetic tape.11 The 
Commission apparently assumes that the inclusion of the term 
"phonograph records" in this phrase limits the description to 
audio media. However, nothing in the wording or punctuation 
of that phrase so limits the use of the words "magnetic tape." 
It is undisputed that Video West is engaged in the manufacture 
of "pre-recorded magnetic tape." The Commission expressly 
indicated this in its "Findings of Fact" in which it found: 
"4. The magnetic tape used by Bonneville Communications and 
Video West in their respective operations is essentially the 
same material." [Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission 
dated September 3, 1992 at 2.] 
In contrast, the activities described in Code 7819 
do not include modern-day videocassette reproduction. Code 
7819 describes traditional Hollywood-style movie making. This 
activity, and the service activities that were allied to movie 
making in 1972, are a far cry from the manufacture of 
duplicate videocassettes today. 
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Finally, the Commission erred by concluding that 
the description contained in Code 7819, a service Code, is 
more likely to include the manufacture of video reproductions 
than Code 3652, which is a manufacturing Code. In reaching 
its decision, the Commission chose to ignore the fact that 
Code 7819 is contained in Division I of the Manual, which is 
entitled "Services," while Code 3652 is included in Division 
D entitled "Manufacturing." If any intent can be gleaned from 
the 1972 Manual, it must be that the drafters of the Manual 
contemplated that the descriptions contained in Division I 
would include only the rendition of services, not the 
manufacture of tangible goods. Thus, even if the Commission's 
methodology is correct, the Commission should have opted for 
the SIC Code that is clearly a "manufacturing" code instead of 
the "service" code that it chose. 
III. The Commission Has Abused Its Discretion. If Any Has 
Been Granted. To Interpret Section 59-12-104(15). 
A. The Legislature Did Not Grant the Commission 
Discretion in the Interpretation of the 
Statute. 
There is nothing in the language of Section 59-12-
104(15) that expressly grants the Commission any discretion in 
the interpretation and/or application of the terms 
"manufacturer" and "manufacturing facility" for purposes of 
the exemption. See supra note 1. Bonneville recognizes, 
however, that the Legislature may implicitly grant an agency 
some discretion in interpreting statutory terms. 
The Legislature, in many instances, has 
explicitly granted agencies discretion in dealing 
with specific statutory terms. Apart from such 
explicit grants of authority, courts have also 
recognized that grants of discretion may be implied 
from the statutory language. For example, we have 
held that when the operative terms of a statute are 
broad and generalized, these terms "bespeak a 
legislative intent to delegate their interpretation 
to the responsible agency.11 We have also granted 
an agency's statutory interpretation deference when 
the legislature had left the specific question at 
issue unresolved. 
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 
1991). 
In this case, the language at issue does not 
explicitly grant discretion to the Commission in interpreting 
the terms "manufacturer" and "manufacturing facility." 
Moreover, there is no indication that the Legislature 
implicitly granted discretion to the Commission in 
interpreting those terms. The language of Section 59-12-
104(15) is not "broad and generalized," but is specific. 
Although the Commission will undoubtedly argue that its 
decision should be given deference, there is nothing in the 
statute to support the notion that the Commission has 
discretion to determine the proper meaning of the statute. 
B. Even if this Court Finds that the Commission 
Has Been Given Sprnq Piscyetipq, £fcg 
Commissions Decision Constitutes an Abuse of 
that pigcyetjon. 
Even if the Commission has been granted some 
discretion, the Commission has abused that discretion based on 
the record in this case. Under the UAPA, relief may be 
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granted "if, on the basis of the agency's record, [the 
appellate court] determines that - . . ( h ) the agency action 
is (i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute," Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989). As the Utah 
Supreme Court has held, "an agency has abused its discretion 
when the agency's action, viewed in the context of the 
language and purpose of the governing statute, is 
unreasonable." Morton, 814 P.2d at 587; see also Mor-Flo 
Indus.. Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
As set forth above, the Legislature undoubtedly 
enacted the sales tax exemption in Section 59-12-104(15) for 
the purpose of encouraging investment in manufacturing 
facilities in Utah. Thus, any reading of the statute that 
runs directly contrary to the purpose of the exemption would 
be unreasonable and, therefore, an abuse of discretion. 
Morton. 814 P. 2d at 587. Yet, the Commission's interpretation 
of Section 59-12-104(15) in this case runs directly contrary 
to the purpose of that exemption. Indeed, the Commission has 
affirmatively acknowledged that Video West's activities 
constitute the manufacture of reproduced video tapes. [Record 
at 67]. In the face of that concession, however, the 
Commission has interpreted that statute in such a way as to 
deny the exemption to Video West, thereby removing any tax 
incentive toward investment in new video manufacturing 
facilities in Utah. Thus, viewed in the context of the 
language and purpose of the statute, the Commission's 
interpretation is unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of 
discretion that must be reversed, 
COpciffgjON 
The Commission erred in interpreting the meaning 
and scope of the terms "manufacturer11 and "manufacturing 
facility" as used in Utah Code Ann, § 59-12-104(15), thus its 
decision must be reversed on that basis. Moreover, even if 
the Commission's interpretation were correct, the Commission's 
application of its own interpretation of the statute to the 
facts of this case is erroneous. Finally, the Commission has 
abused its discretion, if any exists, in interpreting the 
meaning and scope of Section 59-12-104(15), because the 
Commission's interpretation is unreasonable in light of the 
context and purpose of that statute. Accordingly, the 
Commission's decision denying Bonneville's claim for refund of 
sales taxes paid on purchases of Video West equipment should 
be reversed. 
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DATED this 7 day of January, 1993. 
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